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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 31, 2013, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit ruled that New York Southern District Judge Shira
Scheindlin lacked the requisite impartiality to rule on the high profile civil
rights case Floyd v. City of New York.1 The panel concluded that Judge
Scheindlin’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned under 28 U.S.C. §

1. See 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing Judge Shira Scheindlin’s bias,
or the potential appearance of bias, under 28 U.S.C. § 455).
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455 and vacated her August 12 ruling against the City of New York.2 Two
years earlier, the Northern District of California examined Judge Vaughn
Walker’s impartiality in another high profile civil rights case, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.3 The Northern District of California concluded, however,
that Judge Walker’s impartiality could not be questioned under § 455, the
same statute analyzed by the Second Circuit in Floyd.4
This Comment argues that the Perry court applied the appropriate
standard required by § 455(a) and properly declined to speculate as to
Judge Walker’s bias, while the Second Circuit erred in Floyd by applying a
lower standard for disqualification and gave too much weight to
characterizations of Judge Scheindlin in the media.5 Part II of this
Comment reviews the language of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the case law
interpreting the statute, and the procedural history of Perry and Floyd.6
Part III argues that the Second Circuit should not have disqualified Judge
Scheindlin because she did not make statements to the media that discussed
the merits of the Floyd case, nor did her statements in a related case,
Daniels, warrant an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.7 Part IV
offers policy arguments to amend the vague language of § 455, which
would allow for a more uniform application of the statute across the federal
system.8 Part V concludes that the vagueness of the statutory language
may have contributed to its misapplication in Floyd.9

2. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (noting that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate
judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).
3. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(assessing the defendant-intervenors’ motion to disqualify trial Judge Vaughn Walker
due to his sexual orientation and the fact that the case concerned gay marriage rights in
California).
4. See id. at 1133 (denying the defendant-intervenors’ motion and finding no
evidence that Judge Walker would be incapable of being impartial).
5. See, e.g., Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (applying an understanding of the
reasonable person who is familiar with the facts and law of the underlying challenge to
Judge Walker’s impartiality).
6. See infra Part II (discussing the federal appellate and Supreme Court litigation
over § 455).
7. See infra Part III (using the Perry ruling to highlight the inconsistent approach
taken by the Second Circuit in Floyd).
8. See infra Part IV (proposing changes to the statutory language of § 455 to
enable courts to consistently apply the standard).
9. See infra Part V (concluding that the vague language of § 455 led to its
inconsistent application in Floyd and Perry).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. 28 U.S.C. § 455 and the Case Law Interpreting It
28 U.S.C. § 455, enacted by Congress in 1970, governs the
disqualification of federal judges for impartiality and financial or fiduciary
interest.10 Subsection (a) of § 455 provides a general standard for the
disqualification of judges whose impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.11 Subsection (b) of § 455 provides additional self-recusal
standards for federal judges due to personal involvement in the case or
financial and fiduciary interests.12
Federal judges are presumed to be impartial.13
The test for
disqualification under § 455(a) is an objective test that views the judge’s
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable third-person; one who does
not engage in speculation but considers the specifically alleged facts
suggesting bias that the challenging party advances.14 United States v.
Holland helped articulate this reasonable person perspective.15 In Holland,
the defendant was charged with mailing threats to the President of the
United States, and when he discovered the trial judge’s phone number he
left the judge threatening messages as well.16 The trial judge did not recuse
himself and the Ninth Circuit agreed that recusal was not warranted under §
455.17 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, although threats are not to be taken
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (providing for the disqualification of federal
justices, judges, and magistrates for impartiality, financial, or fiduciary interest).
11. See generally Maria G. Roberson, Annotation, Construction and application of
28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a), 40 A.L.R. FED. 954 (1978) (discussing the history of the
disqualification statute from its origins as a subjective test to its currently objective
test).
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2012) (enumerating several scenarios, such as where a
judge has previously worked as an attorney on the case, where disqualification is
warranted).
13. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that federal judges are presumed to be impartial and are expected to rule on
their assigned cases).
14. See United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (illustrating
that the 1974 amendment removed the subjectivity of “in [the judge’s] opinion” and
replaced it with an objective test of a reasonable third party).
15. See generally id. (analyzing a judge’s duty to recuse himself based on threats
made against the judge by a defendant in a pending case).
16. See id. at 911 (recalling that the defendant, who had been previously convicted
of violent crimes, left threatening voice messages for the judge ruling on his guilty
plea).
17. See id. at 917 (affirming the trial judge’s decision not to recuse as the threats
were insufficient for a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality).
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lightly, the analysis of a judge’s impartiality is not from the perspective of
a “partly-informed-man-in-the-street.”18 Rather § 455(a) mandates recusal
only when an objective and informed member of the public, with
knowledge of the underlying facts and law, would find a reasonable basis
for doubting the judge’s impartiality.19 Consequently, though perhaps a
passing member of the public may have found the threats sufficient to
justify recusal, the Ninth Circuit found that a knowledgeable observer who
understands that judges have a “strong duty to sit” would not have
supported recusal.20
Section 455 calls for disqualification in circumstances that constitute an
appearance of partiality, even where no actual bias is shown.21
Additionally, the bias required for recusal must be extrajudicial—meaning
the statements or actions by the judge must occur outside of court—and the
§ 455 analysis not based upon in court rulings or comments made in the
proceeding at issue.22 This is known as the extrajudicial source doctrine,
which, except in the rarest instances of favoritism, requires that the
disqualification analysis ignore what the judge has said or learned from his
participation in the instant case.23
1. Liteky v. United States and Limited Exceptions to the Extrajudicial
Source Doctrine in Extreme Circumstances
The extrajudicial source doctrine requires that for an impartiality
analysis, a judge’s in court statements will not be considered except in rare
circumstances.24 In Liteky v. United States, the Supreme Court refused to
18. See id. at 914 (distinguishing the informed reasonable person who understands
the presumption that judges hear a case they are assigned to from a passing observer
who may be shocked by threats against a judge).
19. See In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1980) (finding rumors,
innuendos, and erroneous information published as fact insufficient to support a finding
of factual bias).
20. See Holland, 519 F.3d at 916-17 (ruling that, based on the presumption that
judges hear assigned cases, the defendant’s threats did not warrant a § 455
disqualification).
21. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988)
(establishing, after a 1976 amendment to the statute, that the § 455 disqualification
applies where the objective appearance of bias, and not actual bias, is shown).
22. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (applying the
extrajudicial doctrine for disqualification, meaning that the source of bias or
impartiality must be out-of-court or extrajudicial).
23. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966) (holding that a
judge’s “terse” exclusion of what he felt to be irrelevant evidence was insufficient to
warrant disqualification, due to the extrajudicial source doctrine).
24. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551 (explaining that the extrajudicial source doctrine

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

5

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

202

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23.1

grant a recusal motion based on a judge’s admonition of the defense, its
witnesses, and the defendant throughout the course of the trial.25 At issue
in Liteky was whether a judge’s alleged “anti-defendant” tone and his
“cutting off” of defense witness testimony could be considered for a §
455(a) analysis despite occurring in court during the proceeding at issue.26
The Supreme Court ruled that the conduct complained of would not be
considered because it occurred in court and did not rise to the level of
“deep-seated” favoritism to justify an exception to the extrajudicial source
doctrine.27
The extrajudicial source doctrine, however, provides for a rare
exception, allowing a judge’s in court statement to weigh on his
impartiality when the judge’s statements exhibit such a high degree of
favoritism that fair judgment would be impossible.28 In United States v.
Antar, a judge stated in court that his goal from the start of the case was to
give back to the public.29 Despite the extrajudicial source doctrine’s
presumption that only out-of-court statements or actions by a judge are
applicable under § 455(a), the Third Circuit in Antar ruled that the trial
judge’s proclamation that his goal was to give back to the public provided a
stark example of the antagonism to a party that justified an exception under
Liteky.30 Despite occurring in court, the Third Circuit found the judge’s
statements to exhibit such a high degree of favoritism to justify
disqualification.31

requires that only out-of-court, or extrajudicial statements by a judge bear on his
impartiality).
25. See id. at 542 (discussing underlying facts of the recusal motion, where the
defendant was convicted for willful destruction of property at a Military Reserve).
26. See id. at 542-43 (examining whether displays of impatience with the defense
during trial was sufficient to justify an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine).
27. See id. at 555 (crafting a limited exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine
where an in-court statement can be considered when the evidence of an extreme
animosity to a party makes the judge unable to render fair judgment).
28. See id. at 551 (finding that despite the existence of the exception, the general
presumption favors the exclusion of in court statements by a judge for a § 455
analysis).
29. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 576 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding an
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine where the judge made it clear to the
parties that his goal in the case was different than what it should have been).
30. See id. at 576 (ruling that the trial judge’s stated wishes provided the
government such an easy path to conviction that fair judgment was virtually
impossible).
31. See id. at 584 (recognizing the limited nature of an extrajudicial source
doctrine exception while remanding the case to a different trial judge).
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While the exception provided in Antar saw the existence of extreme
favoritism, predictions by a judge about the outcome of a trial made in
court, even against a criminal defendant, are not sufficient to warrant an
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.32 In United States v. Young,
the defendant was convicted in district court in Colorado for two counts of
money laundering, and the trial judge stated during a guilty plea colloquy
that if the defendant proceeded to trial, she obviously would be convicted.33
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the trial judge’s “prediction” to defense
counsel did not support a finding of deep seated favoritism, thereby
affirming the limited circumstances that permit an extrajudicial source
doctrine exception.34 The Tenth Circuit found the judge’s statement
insufficient to warrant an exception because the judge’s remarks about
what the jury may find does not impact his ability to render fair judgment,
nor did it indicate that he would be unable to carry out his responsibilities
impartially.35 Consequently, the court refused to disqualify the Young
judge under § 455(a).36
2. Extraordinary Circumstances and Statements to the Media: Nichols v.
Alley and U.S. v. Cooley
Two Tenth Circuit cases from the mid-nineties explain the kind of
conduct that may cause a reasonable observer to question a judge’s
impartiality in highly publicized cases.37 Statements that a judge makes to
the media can raise the appearance of bias when the judge discusses the
parties’ claims in a case, such as appearing on television criticizing a party

32. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to grant a recusal where the trial judge stated in pretrial that it was clear the
defendant would be convicted).
33. See id. (describing the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial judge,
where the judge stated that a preview of the “coming attractions” involved the
defendant being convicted and sent to county jail).
34. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 554 (maintaining that, absent a limited exception, the §
455 analysis is confined to out-of-court statements and actions by a judge).
35. See Young, 45 F.3d at 1415-16 (explaining that nothing in the judge’s
prediction of the case’s outcome evinced deep seated favoritism or an unwillingness to
rule impartially).
36. See id. at 1416 (affirming the defendant’s conviction and finding no § 455
violations based on the judge prediction of guilt).
37. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding the
appearance of bias in a trial of a bombing suspect where the bomb detonated a block
away from the judge’s chambers); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir.
1993) (addressing the recusal of a judge who appeared on Nightline discussing the
merits of a case he was hearing).
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or conducting “secret interviews” discussing the specific claims.38 In
Cooley, the defendants were charged with willfully impeding United States
Marshals during an abortion protest.39 The district judge who presided over
the case, Judge Patrick Kelly, chose to conduct an interview with Barbara
Walters on Nightline, in which he stated in part that the abortion protesters
were breaking the law.40 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Judge
Kelly abused his discretion in denying the recusal motion because the
judge’s voluntary appearance on a national television show to discuss and
offer his opinion on ongoing protests, the legality of which he was charged
with determining, created the appearance of bias in the mind of a
reasonable person under § 455(a).41
Nevertheless, judges cannot control all that is written about them, and
media interviews do not cause per se disqualification because reporters’
personal opinions or characterizations of judges do not generally cause a
reasonable observer to question a judge’s impartiality.42
When considering a motion to disqualify, reviewing courts engage in
several factual analyses, such as examining statements that judges make to
the media, threats made against the judge, and a judge’s relationship with
the parties.43 In Nichols v. Alley, the petitioner was an accomplice to the
Oklahoma City Bombing that killed 169 people.44 Nichols requested
recusal of the judge assigned to the case, Judge Wayne Alley, because the
38. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(holding that a federal judge’s interviews discussing the merits of an ongoing antitrust
case, with hand-picked reporters, gave rise to an appearance of bias).
39. See id. at 989 (describing the basis for the charges, where protesters scaled the
walls of a Kansas abortion clinic and blocked access to the clinic from the inside).
40. See id. at 995 (recounting Judge Kelly’s appearance on Nightline, where he
stated that the clinic protesters were acting illegally and that he would make sure that
his injunctive order against the protesters would be honored).
41. See Cooley, 1 F.3d at 995 (finding that Judge Kelly’s conduct so displayed the
appearance of bias that it could not survive an abuse of discretion review standard, let
alone de novo).
42. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (enumerating several factual scenarios, such as
media reports characterizing or misattributing quotes to the judge, prior rulings, and
familiarity with the parties, as insufficient to find of the appearance of partiality under
§ 455(a)).
43. See id. (recounting the common impartiality analyses claims based on rumor,
innuendo, and speculation, that do not give rise to a finding of § 455(a) partiality).
44. See generally Nancy Gibbs, The Blood of Innocents, TIME, June 24, 2001,
http://www.content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,134077,00.html
(describing
the scene on the ground when a bomb was detonated at the Alfred P. Murrah federal
building in Oklahoma City killing over 160 people and wounding several hundred
more).
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judge’s courtroom and chambers was a mere one block away from the
bombing and the blast shattered the windows of his chambers and injured a
member of his staff.45 The Tenth Circuit, while systematically examining
the standards for recusal and bias, found that these extraordinary facts gave
rise to an appearance of bias despite no fault on the part of Judge Alley.46
The court ruled that, based on the damage cause to Judge Alley’s chambers
and his proximity to the blast, a reasonable observer could question Judge
Alley’s impartiality.47 Although the facts of Nichols are very unusual, its
significance stems from the fact that the Nichols court extensively
discussed the circumstances such as speaking on the merits of the case or
having a fiduciary interest in the outcome that give rise to the appearance
of partiality.48 Nichols supports the rule that, absent unusual circumstances
such as a party destroying the judge’s chambers, mere statements to the
media, threats made against the judge, and prior rulings by a judge are
insufficient for disqualification.49
3. Hormel v. Helvering and Review of Issues Not Raised Below
Although reviewing courts are generally limited to the issues raised by
parties below, there is an exception where not allowing the reviewing court
to rule on the issue would constitute a plain miscarriage of justice.50 In
Hormel v. Helvering the Supreme Court established that, in order to
prevent the plain miscarriage of justice, a reviewing court may consider
and rule on issues not raised by the lower court or the parties.51 The

45. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 349-50 (noting the destruction that the bomb caused in
Judge Alley’s chambers, including the injury of a member of his staff, destruction of
the skylight, and breaking of windows).
46. See id. at 352 (acknowledging that Judge Alley did nothing wrong, however
still finding that Judge Alley’s case is outside the scope of traditional § 455 analyses).
47. See id. (finding that the unique relationship between Judge Alley and the
defendant would lead a reasonable observer to question his impartiality due to the
impact that the defendant’s actions had on Judge Alley’s life).
48. See id. at 351 (describing the factual circumstances, including speculation,
threats, media appearances, and prior rulings, that courts examine under § 455(a) and
distinguishing the extraordinary facts of Nichols from these facts).
49. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(explaining that § 455(a) carries a presumption of judicial impartiality that the
challenging party must overcome to receive the remedy of disqualification).
50. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 555 (1941) (recognizing that, despite a
limited exception, a reviewing court may only rule on issues raised by the parties in the
lower court).
51. See id. at 557 (finding that, where the judge’s statements make fair judgment
appear impossible, a reviewing court may consider in-court statements).
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petitioner in Hormel was a taxpayer who did not include trust income in his
returns, and the Board of Tax Appeals concluded that he acted
appropriately under the two Internal Revenue Code provisions argued for
by the Commissioner, § § 166 and 167.52 On appeal, the Commissioner
argued successfully to the Eighth Circuit that § 22(a) applied even though
the applicability of that statute was not raised below.53 The Supreme Court
upheld the Eighth Circuit decision, despite the general understanding that
reviewing courts should confine their analysis to issues raised below,
because the Commissioner did not have the benefit of § 22(a) at the time of
the Tax Board ruling and it would have been impossible for the
Commissioner to make the 22(a) arguments to the Tax Board.54 Therefore,
the Supreme Court concluded that the Eighth Circuit properly ruled by
allowing a consideration of § 22(a) in order to prevent a plain miscarriage
of justice.55
B. The Perry Litigation and Impartiality Ruling
In 2008, California voters passed Proposition 8, which limited the
definition of marriage to one man and one woman and thereby outlawed
same-sex marriage in the state.56 Two same-sex couples filed suit against
the Governor of California alleging violations of due process and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.57 Proponents of Proposition
8 intervened on behalf of the defendants, and the city and county of San
Francisco intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs.58
52. See id. at 554-55 (highlighting the Tax Board of Appeals’ ruling that the
petitioner’s trust income was not taxable under Internal Revenue Code § 167, and
therefore the Commissioner should not have assessed a deficiency).
53. See id. at 560 (holding that to limit all appellate considerations to only issues
raised below would, in the instance of § 22(a), defeat rather than promote the ends of
justice).
54. See id. at 558 (avoiding a hard and fast limit of appellate review and allowing
for special circumstances where a court may examine issues not raised previously).
55. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting
Justice Black’s proclamations in Hormel set the stage for appellate review of issues not
raised in the lower courts).
56. See Randal C. Archibold & Abby Goodnough, California Voters Ban Gay
Marriage,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
5,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/us/politics/06ballot.html?_r=0 (reporting that
California voters passed Proposition 8 with 52% of the vote in an added referendum
portion to the 2008 ballot).
57. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(chronicling the history of Perry’s underlying challenge to Proposition 8, which alleged
that the amendment violated same-sex couples’ right to equal protection).
58. See Press Release, City Attorney of San Francisco, San Francisco Moves to
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On August 4, 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker of the Northern District of
California ruled that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional under the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 In
response, the defendant-intervenors challenged Judge Walker’s ruling in
the case, arguing that Judge Walker’s sexual orientation and his same-sex
relationship diminished his ability to rule impartially.60 Another judge in
the Northern District of California, Judge James Ware, analyzed the
defendant-intervenors’ motion to disqualify and ultimately denied their
request.61 Judge Ware concluded that Judge Walker’s impartiality could not
reasonably be questioned under § 455 because, like other minority groups,
Judge Walker’s sexual orientation does not alone create actual bias nor the
appearance of bias.62 Therefore, Judge Ware’s ruling concluded that under
§ 455(a), a reasonable, thoughtful person with knowledge of the underlying
facts and law could not question a judge’s impartiality based on speculation
that the judge’s membership in a minority class would limit his ability to
rule impartially in a case affecting that class.63
C. The Floyd Litigation and Impartiality Ruling
In January 2008, a class-certified group of African Americans and Latin
Americans filed a suit against the NYPD in Floyd v. City of New York
alleging that their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated by the NYPD stop-and-frisks conducted without reasonable
articulable suspicion.64 The case was assigned to Judge Shira Scheindlin,
Intervene in Federal Challenge to Proposition 8 (July 23, 2009) (explaining that the city
has a “unique public sector perspective” on having to enforce a discriminatory law).
59. See Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (applying strict scrutiny to invalidate
Proposition 8 under Due Process, but rational basis to invalidate it under Equal
Protection).
60. See Judge Who Struck Down Proposition 8 Knew Case Would Go Far,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 29, 2013) (downloaded using NPR’s media player)
(explaining in an interview how Judge Walker predicted that his sexual orientation
would be at the forefront of the litigation).
61. See generally Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)(assessing
Judge Walker’s ability to rule on the Perry case under § 455(a) based on claimed bias
due to the judge’s sexual orientation).
62. See id. at 1128-29 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (analogizing that disqualifying Judge
Walker for his membership in a class would be akin to disqualifying other groups, such
as women, from ruling on cases that involved issues affecting women as a whole).
63. See id. at 1131 (refusing to speculate that Judge Walker’s interest in marrying
his partner would cause a well-informed, thoughtful observer to question Judge
Walker’s impartiality).
64. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(agreeing with the plaintiffs, after the presentation of statistics compiled over several
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who had been a federal judge since 1994.65 On August 12, 2013, following
a nine-week trial, Judge Scheindlin held that the City of New York indeed
violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.66
The Second Circuit chose to review Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua
sponte because of comments she made to the media while the case was
being litigated and comments she made to the plaintiffs in Daniels v. City
of New York, an action that also dealt with NYPD civil rights violations.67
During a motion to extend the settlement period in Daniels, Judge
Scheindlin engaged in a colloquy with the plaintiffs.68 Specifically, she
told the Daniels plaintiffs that New York City violated its own antiprofiling policy and that the plaintiffs had proof of racial profiling in a
“good constitutional case.”69 Judge Scheindlin additionally told the Daniels
plaintiffs that they could mark their claim as related to the Floyd
litigation.70
Furthermore, while Floyd was being litigated, Judge Scheindlin
conducted interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law
Journal, where she discussed the many civil rights suits she has heard
against the NYPD, and a mayoral report that found that she granted
motions to suppress more frequently than her colleagues.71 Additionally,
years, that the implementation of the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk policy is racially
discriminatory).
65. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rights and Wrongs: A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk,
NEW
YORKER,
May
17,
2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/27/130527fa_fact_toob
(describing
Judge Shcheindlin’s background and her experience as a judge in civil rights cases,
hearing suits against police officers and New York City since her appointment in
1994).
66. See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 658 (ruling that, based on the statistics showing
the prevalence of unjustified stops of innocent blacks and Hispanics, the city is liable
for violating the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
67. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 135-37 (2d Cir. 2013)
(recognizing that Judge Scheindlin felt that the NYPD had violated its own antidiscrimination and anti-profiling policies based on the plaintiffs’ claims).
68. See id. at 137 (discussing the NYPD’s compliance, or lack of compliance, with
its own written rule concerning racial profiling).
69. See id. at 135 (suggesting to the plaintiffs that they may have a basis to bring
suit against the city for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations).
70. See id. at 142 (identifying the racial profiling by the NYPD under a probable
cause analysis in Daniels as related to the racial profiling under reasonable articulable
suspicion analysis in Floyd).
71. See Larry Nuemeister, NY ‘frisk’ judge calls criticism ‘below-the-belt,’
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 19, 2013, http://www.news.yahoo.com/ny-frisk-judge-calls-
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Judge Scheindlin described herself as a jurist who is skeptical of law
enforcement.72 Judge Scheindlin also discussed with the media a letter
written by the New York Lawyers Association, which purported to show
that Judge Scheindlin is biased against law enforcement.73 In the article
published by The New Yorker, titled “A Judge Takes On Stop-and-Frisk,”
Judge Scheindlin described her commitment to uphold the Bill of Rights
and spoke about her interactions with the NYPD in her time as a federal
judge, during which she has found that police had lied, discriminated
against people of color, and violated the rights of citizens.74
In the fall of 2013, the Second Circuit reviewed Judge Scheindlin’s
impartiality sua sponte, citing Hormel as its justification for doing so.75 On
October 31, 2013, the panel issued a short order declaring that by making
the above statements, Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of Canon 3C of the
Judicial Code of Conduct, thereby vacating her decision and removing her
from the case.76 However, on November 13, the same Second Circuit panel
issued a follow up to its October 31 order, relaxing its critique of Judge
Scheindlin, but nonetheless affirming her disqualification.77 In the opinion
issued on November 13, the Second Circuit elaborated on its findings of
bias, and focused specifically on Judge Scheindlin’s conduct under 28
U.S.C. § 455(a).78 The court did not conclude that Judge Scheindlin was

criticism-below-belt-160257320.html (describing Judge Scheindlin’s interactions with
the NYPD in court where she says she has seen examples of discrimination and lying
on the stand).
72. See id. (distinguishing herself from judges who are “a little more timid to
maybe disagree with the U.S. Attorney’s Office”).
73. See
Mark
Hamblett, Stop–and–Frisk
Judge
Relishes
her
Independence, N.Y.L.J,
May
20,
2013,
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202600625151
(describing
Judge
Scheindlin’s civil-rights centered jurisprudence).
74. See Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 2 (framing the then-ongoing
Floyd litigation around Judge Scheindlin’s history with the NYPD, which extended
back to civil rights cases she has heard against the city since 1994).
75. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (invoking
Hormel’s review of issues not raised below in order to prevent a plain miscarriage of
justice).
76. See generally Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013)
(concluding, beyond just a finding of § 455 bias, that Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges).
77. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (establishing that the court
made no findings that Judge Scheindlin has engaged in judicial misconduct).
78. See id. at 123 (illustrating that § 455(a) is an objective test that does not
require actual bias, but only the appearance of bias, to justify disqualification).
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actually biased.79 Instead, it reasoned that Judge Scheindlin’s comments
about the validity of the plaintiff’s claim in Daniels, along with her
comments to the media about her unfavorable history with the NYPD,
taken together, created the appearance of bias such that she should be
disqualified under § 455(a).80
The court thereafter denied Judge
Scheindlin’s motion to protest, concluding that she lacked standing to
challenge the reassignment.81 The Second Circuit’s ruling, and the
outcome of that ruling, offers a more stringent application of § 455 than in
Perry, and leads to unpredictable results for federal courts applying the §
455 disqualification statute.82
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Second Circuit Misapplied § 455(a) in Concluding that Judge
Scheindlin’s Impartiality Could Reasonably be Questioned Because the
Court Lowered the Reasonable Person Standard Articulated in § 455(a)
Case Law.
Comparing the standards applied by the Northern District of California’s
assessment of Judge Ware in Perry with the Second Circuit’s assessment of
Judge Scheindlin in Floyd illustrates the errors that the Second Circuit
made in applying § 455(a).83 First, while the Perry court considered the
proper burden to overcome in disqualifying a federal judge, the Second
Circuit incorrectly applied a lower standard that more easily triggered
disqualification.84 Second, the Second Circuit did not engage in a § 455

79. See id. at 129 (establishing that the court made no finding of actual bias in
Judge Scheindlin’s case, just the appearance of bias).
80. See id. at 125, 129 (concluding that, given the public scrutiny of the Floyd
litigation, Judge Scheindlin’s comments in Daniels gave the appearance of steering the
case to her docket).
81. See In re Motion of Dist. Judge, 736 F.3d 166, 170-71 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding,
in part, that Judge Scheindlin has no standing to protest her reassignment).
82. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1133 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (finding no appearance of bias with Judge Walker under § 455), with In re
Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (ruling that a judge’s statements to the media
and a colloquy with the plaintiffs in a related case contravened § 455).
83. See generally Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1133 (assessing Judge Walker’s
appearance of impartiality based on the defendant-intervenors’ claim that his sexual
orientation barred impartial judgment under § 455(a)); In re Reassignment of Cases,
736 F.3d at 129 (analyzing Judge Scheindlin’s appearance of impartiality under §
455(a)).
84. See Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1129 (acknowledging the substantial burden that
a party challenging a judge’s impartiality bears).
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reasonable person analysis, which views the reasonable person as one with
knowledge of the underlying facts and law.85 Finally, the extrajudicial
source doctrine, and its application to Judge Scheindlin’s case, does not
support a finding of the appearance of impartiality under § 455 because her
statements in Daniels do not rise to the level of favoritism that warrant an
exception.86
1. The Northern District of California Applied the Appropriate Standard
Because it Acknowledged the Heavy Burden to Show that a Judge’s
Impartiality May Reasonably be Questioned.
The analysis under § 455 begins with the presumption that a judge is
impartial, which creates a heavy burden for the party seeking
disqualification.87 In its opinion, the Northern District of California cited
the substantial burden in its assessment of Judge Walker under § 455(a)
and upheld that burden by refusing to speculate as to whether Judge Walker
was biased merely because of his sexual orientation.88 The Northern
District of California maintained that questioning Judge Walker’s
impartiality merely on the basis of his involvement in a same sex
relationship would force the court to accede to unsubstantiated suspicion
that is insufficient under § 455(a).89 Section 455(a) requires a fact-specific
analysis, and the defendant-intervenors carried the burden of providing
articulable facts giving rise to a finding of partiality.90 To meet their
burden, the defendant-intervenors needed to allege specific facts beyond a
mere generalization that Judge Walker’s sexual orientation influenced his

85. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that in the context of § 455(a), the reasonable person is someone who
“understand[s] all the relevant facts” and “has examined the record and law”).
86. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (explaining that under
the extrajudicial source doctrine, opinions held by judges because of what they learned
in earlier proceedings are not to be characterized as bias or prejudice).
87. See Holland, 519 F.3d at 911-12 (noting that the proposition that a judge
should participate in their cases absent legitimate reason is derived from Article III of
the Constitution).
88. See Torres v. Chrysler Fin. Co., No. C 07-00915 JW, 2007 WL 3165665, at *1
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (establishing that a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, and the
party seeking disqualification must meet a high burden to show bias).
89. See Clemens v. U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, 428
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005) (articulating that the party challenging a judge cannot
meet the § 455 burden by speculating about a relationship, without evidence of bias).
90. See id. at 1178 (articulating that the § 455(a) analysis is fact-specific and
focuses on the unique circumstances in the present case, without engaging in
speculation).
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potential bias, which they failed to do, and the Northern District
appropriately denied their motion.91
On the other hand, the Second Circuit panel in its opinion issued on
November 13, 2013, did not acknowledge the substantial burden to
overcome the presumption that a judge lacks impartiality.92 Perhaps, the
Second Circuit did not acknowledge the burden a party bears because a
party did not actually raise the issue.93 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
precedent that the Second Circuit relied on for its sua sponte justification,
Hormel v. Helvering, allows for appellate review of an issue not raised
below in “exceptional” cases with “peculiar” circumstances.94 Therefore,
the Second Circuit, in invoking Hormel, would presumably mention the
extraordinary circumstances of Judge Scheindlin’s bias or the plain
miscarriage of justice that would result from allowing her to preside over
the case.95 In other words, by citing Hormel as its justification for
reviewing judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua sponte, the court implicitly
acknowledged that her case is peculiar, or alternatively, that not doing so
would result in a plain miscarriage of justice.96 Yet, the Second Circuit’s
opinion is replete with language softening its criticism of Judge Scheindlin
and in fact, the court conceded that she may not be biased.97 By invoking
Hormel, which allows for review of issues not raised below only in peculiar
circumstances or to present a miscarriage of justice, one would expect that
the Second Circuit’s opinion would speak to the injustice that would result
91. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1133 ((N.D. Cal. 2011)
(taking the defendant-intervenors’ argument to its logical conclusion and refusing to
find that membership in a minority precludes a judge from ruling on a case that affects
that class).
92. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining
that, though the issue of recusal was not raised either by the parties or the judge herself
in the district court or this court, there is no barrier to reassigning the cases sua sponte).
93. See id. at 129 (addressing Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality sua sponte, as
neither party raised the issue nor invoked § 455).
94. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941) (identifying exceptional
cases or peculiar circumstances as justification for a reviewing court to consider issues
not raised below).
95. See id. at 558 (noting the general presumption that appellate courts do not
weigh on issues not raised below or preserved for appeal, except when there is a plain
miscarriage of justice).
96. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (appealing to Justice Black’s
proclamation in Hormel, that an appellate court may pass upon issues not raised below
in order to prevent injustice to the parties).
97. See id. at 124 (emphasizing that the court makes no findings of misconduct,
actual bias, or actual partiality, in contrast to its October 31 ruling that found that Judge
Scheindlin violated the Code of Judicial Ethics).
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if the court did not step in.98 Instead, the Second Circuit’s admission that
Judge Scheindlin lacked actual bias belies the notion that Judge
Scheindlin’s case was extraordinary such that it risked injustice under
Hormel.99 While no actual bias was found in the Nichols case as well, the
Nichols court made clear that Judge Alley’s case was unusual in that no
direct factual comparison can be made to the standard § 455 analyses such
as media interviews or relationships with the parties.100 Therefore, while
both Floyd and Nichols found that a judge was not actually biased, the
Floyd court focused on the common § 455(a) analyses such as media
interviews.101 Though both cases illustrate disqualification without actual
bias, Nichols is distinguishable in that Judge Alley’s disqualification was
due to the “extraordinary circumstances” of Judge Alley’s chambers being
destroyed—so extraordinary that the court found “no case to look to for
guidance.”102
As the Perry court stated, disqualification of a federal judge places a
high burden on the challenging party, and Hormel requires appellate review
only in exceptional circumstances, such as where a party could not make an
argument at trial that could be made on appeal due to a subsequent
Supreme Court decision.103 Therefore, because Judge Scheindlin’s recusal
was not raised below, the Second Circuit must contend with the already
high standard of recusal in addition to the “exceptional circumstances”
98. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (crafting a limited exception for appellate
intervention on a new issue where not doing so would result in a miscarriage of
justice).
99. Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124 (softening the court’s
earlier ruling that Judge Scheindlin ran afoul of the Judicial Code and finding no actual
bias, only the appearance of bias), with Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (calling for appellate
review of an issue not raised below only in circumstances that risk the plain miscarriage
of justice).
100. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging that
there “is no similar case” with which to compare the “extraordinary” facts of Judge
Alley’s chambers being destroyed by the defendant he would later have to rule over).
101. Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 125-29 (analyzing Judge
Scheindlin based on statements that she made to the media and to the plaintiffs in
another case), with Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352 (assessing Judge Alley based on the fact
that his chambers was one block away from a bomb detonation that the defendant was
partially responsible for).
102. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352 (maintaining that the § 455 analysis is a factual
one, but there are nevertheless no cases with such a extraordinary facts to offer a direct
comparison).
103. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(acknowledging that the party challenging a federal judge’s impartiality carries a
substantial burden to justify the removal of the judge).
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requirement from Hormel.104 However, because the court spent much of
the opinion mitigating its criticism of Judge Scheindlin, its reliance on
Hormel to justify Judge Scheindlin’s disqualification is misplaced.105
Additionally, the factual differences between the two cases illustrate why
the Second Circuit erred in relying on Hormel.106 For instance, in Hormel,
the Commissioner actually raised the § 22(a) arguments to the appellate
court, while New York City did not argue in the District Court or on appeal
that Judge Scheindlin should be disqualified.107 Unlike in Hormel, where
the § 22(a) argument had not been applied to the taxpayer’s situation until
after the lower court ruling, in Floyd the City had ample opportunity to
argue that Judge Scheindlin should be disqualified.108 Judge Scheindlin’s
interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law Journal were
published in May 2013, a few months prior to her August 2013 ruling,
meaning the City could have raised her impartiality during the
proceedings.109 Conversely, in Hormel, the Supreme Court had not
authorized § 22(a)’s application to the taxpayer until after judgment had
been rendered in the taxpayer’s favor.110 Therefore, the Commissioner was
“injusticed” in Hormel because it could not have made an argument to the
lower court that was later raised on appeal whereas the City could have, but
104. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 557 (allowing an appellate court to consider an issue
not raised below only in order to prevent injustice to one of the parties).
105. Cf. Jeffrey Toobin, The Preposterous Removal of Judge Scheindlin, NEW
YORKER,
Oct.
31
2013,
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/10/the-preposterous-removalof-judge-scheindlin.html (arguing, after his interviews became the subject of the ruling,
that the Second Circuit mischaracterized Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the press).
106. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F. 3d at 129 (turning to Hormel to
justify ruling on Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality despite the issue not being raised by
either party at the district or circuit level).
107. Compare Hormel, 312 U.S. at 554-56 (discussing the Eighth Circuit ruling,
where the Commissioner first introduced the § 22(a) argument after the Supreme Court
ruled that § 22(a) was applicable to trust income), with In re Reassignment of Cases,
736 F. 3d at 129 (acknowledging that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality was reviewed sua
sponte).
108. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.2d at 125-29 (assessing Judge
Scheindlin’s impartiality based on media interviews that were published while she was
hearing the case).
109. See, e.g., Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (discussing with
Judge Scheindlin her prior in-court interactions with the NYPD while the Floyd case
was being litigated).
110. See Hormel, 312 U.S. at 559 (noting that the Commissioner could not make
use of § 22(a) in the lower court because the Supreme Court had not yet rendered it
applicable to trust income like petitioner’s until its subsequent decision in Helvering).
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chose not to make the disqualification argument in the lower court.111
These factual differences show why Floyd was not a “plain miscarriage of
justice” as illustrated by Hormel, especially when considered in light of the
softening of its initial criticism of Judge Scheindlin that characterized the
order issued on November 13.112
2. The Northern District of California Correctly Applied the
Knowledgeable Reasonable Person Standard Under § 455(a), While the
Second Circuit Relied on a Less-informed Reasonable Person that Lowered
the Standard for Disqualification
The Northern District of California relied on a complete definition of
who the reasonable person is under a § 455(a) analysis.113 A § 455(a)
reasonable person is not just a passing observer, but rather someone with
knowledge of the facts and law of the underlying action.114 The reasonable
person under § 455(a) does not contemplate a member of the general public
who is unaware of the current litigation and its underlying issues.115 The
Northern District of California recognized as much by stating that the
challenging party must carry the heavy burden.116 The Second Circuit, on
the other hand, discussed a general reasonable “observer” without any
mention of the individual with familiarity of the facts and law of the
underlying action, which is inconsistent with § 455(a).117
The Second Circuit’s understanding of the reasonable person under §
455(a) effectively lowered the standard to trigger disqualification because it
111. See id. at 558 (allowing for appellate review of issues not raised below in
circumstances that would result in a “miscarriage of justice”).
112. See, e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124 (finding that Judge
Scheindlin was not actually biased, and mitigating its criticisms of Judge Scheindlin
from the original order that found she violated the Code of Judicial Conduct).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012) (mandating recusal when a reasonable person
may question a federal justice, judge, or magistrate’s impartiality).
114. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal.
2011)(citing United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008)) (recognizing
that in the context of § 455(a), the reasonable person is not someone who is overly
sensitive to bias but rather a reasonable thoughtful observer that understands the facts
and law).
115. See id. at 1130 (maintaining that a fact is not necessarily a basis for
questioning a judge’s impartiality merely because it might lead to public questioning of
the judge’s impartiality).
116. See id. (acknowledging that judges are presumed to be impartial and that
blanket statements about a judge’s bias due to his membership in a class are
insufficient to overcome this presumption).
117. See generally In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2013)
(noting that the reasonable observer in this situation would find partiality).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

19

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 6

216

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 23.1

did not consider that a reasonable person is someone who has examined the
facts and law of the current case.118 The requirement that a reasonable
person has examined the record of the case heightens the standard, or
makes the reasonable person less sensitive to bias, because the Ninth
Circuit in Holland explained that the § 455 reasonable person does not
mandate recusal upon mere suspicion of bias.119 The Second Circuit
argued that Judge Scheindlin’s interviews could cause a reasonable
observer to question her impartiality.120 However, the Second Circuit
consistently used the language “reasonable observer” as a perspective from
which it analyzed Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality.121 This reasonable
observer is not the same as the reasonable person who is familiar with the
case and law at hand, as evidenced by the fact that the defendants, surely
familiar with the record, the law, and Judge Scheindlin’s interviews, did
not request recusal.122 In Holland, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the
appropriate standard—the knowledgeable reasonable person—from a
“partially-informed-man-in-the-street.”123 Moreover, in Holland, the judge
was faced with threats from the defendant who had a violent history yet the
Ninth Circuit found that these threats may alarm a passerby, but not one
with knowledge of the law that judges have a duty to sit in the cases they
are assigned.124 The Second Circuit failed to acknowledge that the § 455
reasonable person has knowledge of the presumption that judges should
hear their assigned cases.125 In other words, unlike the Perry court, the
118. See, e.g., United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that in the § 455(a) analysis, the reasonable person is thoughtful and not unduly
suspicious).
119. See id. (discussing the fact that a reasonable person should be well-informed
about the facts and law under § 455(a)).
120. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 125-26 (holding that a reasonable
observer may question Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality due to the comments she made
to the press and her colloquy with the Daniels’ plaintiffs).
121. See id. at 124, 126 (discussing the colloquy with the plaintiffs in Daniels to the
extent that it would cause a reasonable “observer” to question Judge Scheindlin’s
impartiality).
122. See id. at 128 (noting that neither party raised the issue of Judge Scheindlin’s
impartiality).
123. Holland, 519 F.3d at 914 (recalling that the § 455 analysis is not subjective
and is not concerned with a judge’s personal feelings, but rather how a thoughtful third
person would interpret the judge’s impartiality).
124. See id. at 915-16 (establishing that the threats made by the defendant—an
individual who had been previously convicted of armed robbery and assault with a
deadly weapon—still did not mandate recusal under a § 455(a) reasonable person
analysis).
125. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124-29 (analyzing Judge
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Second Circuit did not begin its analysis from the perspective of a
reasonable observer who is familiar with the facts and law of the case, and
in so doing, misapplied the § 455(a) standard for disqualification.126
B. Judge Scheindlin’s Interviews with The New Yorker and The New York
Law Journal are Insufficient to Show the Appearance of Bias Because She
Does Not Speak about the Merits of the Claims in the Floyd Case
The Second Circuit erred in ruling that the interviews Judge Scheindlin
conducted with The New Yorker and The New York Law Journal could
cause one to question her impartiality because the reporters made the
characterizations of Judge Scheindlin and she did not discuss the merits of
the Floyd case in those interviews.127 The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in
Cooley is instructive of the type of judge-media interactions that normally
do not justify recusal.128
Looking first to the piece in The New Yorker, the characterizations of
Judge Scheindlin and descriptions of her battles with the NYPD are made
by the author, Jeffery Toobin, and not by the judge herself.129 For instance,
the title of the article, “A Judge Takes on Stop-and-Frisk” evokes Judge
Scheindlin’s stance on the merits of NYC’s stop and frisk policy.130
Scheindlin’s interviews with the media and her statements in Daniels from the
perspective of a reasonable observer, not a well informed third person with knowledge
of a judge’s duty to sit).
126. Compare Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (recognizing that the reasonable person under § 455(a) is well-informed with the
facts and law at hand), with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 124
(characterizing the § 455(a) analysis as a reasonable observer, without mention of the
requirement that the hypothetical person be familiar with the underlying facts and law).
See also Holland, 519 F.3d at 914 (recognizing that in the context of § 455(a), the
reasonable person is not someone who is “hypersensitive or unduly suspicious”).
127. See Recusal: Analysis of Case Law Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, 20
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER
(2002),
available
at
https://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/fjc/recusal.pdf [hereinafter FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER] (outlining that Circuit Court interpretations of § 455(a) permit judges to speak
to reporters during ongoing litigation, so long as characterizations about the case are
made by the reporters and not the judge).
128. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1993) (discussing
the factual circumstances such as prior rulings, statements in court by the judge, and
mere familiarity with the parties as not giving rise to finding of partiality).
129. See, e.g., Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (describing that in
various decisions, Judge Scheindlin has found that police lied and discriminated on the
basis of race).
130. See id. (framing the piece as a judge taking on the NYPD’s policy, without
having the judge comment on the actual stop-and-frisk policy at hand in the case).
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Moreover, the statements Judge Scheindlin does make in the interview,
namely that she believes in upholding the Constitution and Bill of Rights, is
consistent with what judges are permitted to say according to Cooley.131 In
Cooley, Judge Kelly essentially expressed a dedication to uphold the law,
which is insufficient to justify disqualification under § 455.132 However,
unlike Judge Kelly in Cooley, Judge Scheindlin did not discuss the merits
of the Floyd case, nor did she state her opinion about the legality of the
parties’ positions, as Judge Kelly did in his Nightline interview.133 In the
interview, Judge Scheindlin made statements about her background and her
past career as a federal judge, but did not weigh in on the validity of the
plaintiffs’ claims against the NYPD.134 The statements discussing the
merits of the Floyd case are instead attributed to Darius Charney, co-lead
counsel for the plaintiffs.135 Furthermore, in the New York Law Journal
piece mentioned in the Second Circuit’s ruling against Judge Scheindlin,
the author made clear that Judge Scheindlin was not discussing the merits
of the Floyd case.136
Therefore, the articles written about Judge Scheindlin stand in stark
contrast to two recent instances where judges’ media interactions have
caused them to be disqualified because Judge Scheindlin does not discuss
the merits of the claims by the Floyd parties in her interviews.137 For
example, in United States v. Microsoft, a federal judge discussed with
131. See, e.g., Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993-94 (illustrating that a judge expressing a
dedication to uphold the law is insufficient to reasonably question that judge’s
impartiality).
132. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d at 351 (instructing that a judge’s statement of a
willingness to uphold the law is not a proper justification for finding that the judge
lacked the requisite impartiality under § 455(a)).
133. See Cooley, 1 F.3d at 995 (disqualifying a federal judge for appearing on
television while a case was being litigated and stating that the defendant was breaking
the law).
134. See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1 (outlining Judge
Scheindlin’s personal background, her legal career, and her time as a federal judge
since 1994).
135. See id. at 1-2 (discussing, with counsel for the plaintiffs, the statistics that the
plaintiffs brought to argue that the NYPD’s policy violates their rights).
136. See Hamblett, supra note 73 (establishing that the ongoing proceedings in
Floyd were “off the table” in his interview with Judge Scheindlin).
137. Compare Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1-2 (interviewing a
judge who appears openly in an online article to discuss her career while the comments
about a high profile case are limited to the author and statements by the litigants) with
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 34-35 (describing cases where judges
were disqualified for speaking about parties’ claims and met with hand-picked
reporters to discuss cases).
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secret reporters the merits of the underlying case.138 Likewise, in United
States v. Cooley, the presiding judge spoke directly on the merits of the
proceedings by stating, on television, that the protestors were breaking the
law.139 By comparison, Judge Scheindlin did not speak on the merits of
either case or give peculiarly “secret interviews” with “select reporters.”140
As such, although judges are discouraged from appearing in the media
while a case is being litigated, Judge Scheindlin’s conduct in speaking with
the media and the content of those interviews is within the parameters set
forth in Microsoft and Cooley.141
Nichols and Floyd are analogous because they both deal with the
impartiality of federal judges in highly publicized cases, and Nichols is
especially instructive because it illustrates the factual circumstances that
give rise to a questioning of impartiality under § 455 in such a high-profile
case.142 The only statements on the merits of the claims in Floyd are by the
author or the lawyers as quoted by the author, as are the characterizations
of Judge Scheindlin, which the Nichols court made clear was not to be
considered as indicative of the judge’s lack of impartiality.143 Therefore,
the Second Circuit erred in finding the appearance of bias in Judge
Scheindlin’s interviews with The New Yorker and The New York Law
Journal because she did not speak about the merits of the case and the
validity of the parties’ claims.144
138. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 34 (relying on the facts
supporting disqualification in the Microsoft case, where the judge conducted interviews
with select reporters and spoke on the merits of the actual case).
139. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that the
trial judge stated on Nightline that the defendant abortion protestors were acting
illegally and that his injunction against them was to be honored).
140. Compare Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65, at 1-2 (discussing Judge
Scheindlin’s background and history as a federal judge), with FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, supra note 127, at 34-36 (illustrating the circumstances in Cooley and
Microsoft, where judges spoke to the media discussing the parties’ claims).
141. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (instructing that a
judge’s statements to the media are not indicative of partiality under § 455(a) as long as
the judge does not personally speak as to the merits of the case or make
characterizations about the claims of the parties).
142. See id. at 349 (describing the media attention that the Oklahoma City bombing
received and the publicized trials of bombers Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols);
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (chronicling the
NYPD’s controversial stop and frisk policy and the media attention that followed).
143. See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65 (describing Judge
Scheindlin’s judicial history with the NYPD as a “battle” and citing attorneys for the
plaintiffs who discuss their claims about the NYPD’s stop and frisk policy).
144. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 20 (highlighting the case
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C. The Second Circuit Ruled Incorrectly in Finding that Judge Scheindlin’s
Comments to the Plaintiffs in Daniels Weighed on her Impartiality Because
the Extrajudicial Source Doctrine Precludes Their Consideration in a §
455(a) Analysis.
The extrajudicial source doctrine precludes a reviewing court from
considering, for disqualifying purposes, a judge’s statements in court
during the proceeding.145 This bar on “judicial sources” applies to prior
proceedings, especially those involving the same defendant, as well as
related cases.146 The NYPD is named as the defendant in each suit, and
both Floyd and Daniels concern a racially based constitutional claim
against the same entity.147 In that regard, both Floyd and Daniels concern
constitutional violations by the NYPD.148 Floyd alleges that the NYPD
violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights by
conducting racially discriminatory and ineffective stop and frisks while
Daniels involves a lack of probable cause arrest claim that the NYPD
racially profiled the plaintiff.149 Therefore, the extrajudicial source doctrine
should bar Judge Scheindlin’s in-court statements to the plaintiffs’ attorney
in Daniels from bearing on her impartiality in Floyd, because the cases
present related claims against the same defendant and do not warrant an
extrajudicial source doctrine exception.150 Moreover, Judge Scheindlin
instructed the plaintiffs during her colloquy in Daniels that they could mark
their claim as “related” to Floyd, thereby acknowledging the link between

law that emphasizes that judges cannot control everything that is written about them
and are not per se biased for appearing in the media while a case is being litigated).
145. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994) (ruling that opinions
held by judges as a result of what they learned in earlier proceedings are not to be
characterized as “bias” or “prejudice.”).
146. See id. (establishing that it is “normal and proper” for a judge to sit in
successive trials regarding the same defendant and that these proceedings are not
extrajudicial sources).
147. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 137 (2d Cir. 2013) (advising
the plaintiff in Daniels that he could mark his case as a related case, given the nature of
its claims).
148. See Daniels v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 0809, 2003 WL 22510379, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2003) (describing the suit as a pro se false arrest claim against an
NYPD officer for a lack of probable cause).
149. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(presenting a constitutional claim against the NYPD for illegal search and seizures
under the City’s stop and frisk policy).
150. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 20 (noting that under the
extrajudicial source doctrine a judge’s statements during proceedings do not influence
her impartiality).
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the two cases.151
1. Judge Scheindlin’s Colloquy in Daniels Should Not Have Been
Considered Because it Does Not Fit into an Exception to the Extrajudicial
Source Doctrine.
Although the extrajudicial source doctrine precludes in-court statements
by the judge from consideration under § 455(a), there are exceptions, in
rare circumstances, where the judge’s favoritism would make fair judgment
impossible.152 However, Judge Scheindlin’s comments to the plaintiffs in
Daniels are more akin to the permissible prediction of guilt in United States
v. Young, and less like the exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine
granted in the judge’s impermissible statement of his goals in United States
v. Antar.153 In Daniels, Judge Scheindlin told the plaintiffs that they had a
good constitutional case.154 This is essentially weighing in on the merits of
a party’s case, which is permissible in court under the extrajudicial source
doctrine because in court predictions about the outcome of a case do not
raise the appearance of bias.155 In Young, the judge stated that the
defendant would “obviously” be convicted, and the Tenth Circuit
concluded that this statement did not trigger an exception to the
extrajudicial source doctrine because the prediction gave no indication that
the judge would lack impartiality in ruling on evidence or instructing the
jury should the case go to trial.156 In other words, the statement by the
151. Compare Daniels, at *1 (presenting a racial-profiling claim against the NYPD
for an unfounded arrest) with Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 578 (challenging, based upon
racial inequities, the NYPD’s use of stop and frisks in making unwarranted stops of
minorities).
152. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 541 (1994) (recognizing that,
despite the general presumption that in-court statements will not be considered, there is
an allowance for exceptions where the judge displays extreme favoritism).
153. Compare United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1415 (10th Cir. 1995)
(refusing to grant recusal when a judge stated in court pre-trial that the defendant will
“obviously” be convicted) with United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir. 1995)
(granting recusal under an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine because the
judge stated that his goal from the start was to give back to the public what the
defendant fraudulently took).
154. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 135-38 (2d Cir.
2013)(instructing the plaintiffs that they have a strong claim against the NYPD for
violating its own anti-racial profiling policy).
155. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542 (instructing that the appearance of partiality cannot
stem from the current proceedings).
156. See Young, 45 F.3d at 1414-15 (describing the colloquy between the trial judge
and defense counsel, where the judge tells counsel that “the preview of the coming
attractions” entails his client being convicted and going to county jail).
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judge in Young was not prejudicial, or enough of a showing of favoritism,
to allow the reviewing court to consider the in-court statement in a § 455(a)
analysis.157 Judge Scheindlin’s colloquy with the plaintiffs discussed the
prospect of filing a later case, and is less prejudicial than the prediction of
guilt before trial from Young, because Judge Scheindlin’s statement
concerned merely the filing of a later case while the judge’s statement in
Young concerned the defendant’s guilt or innocence in an ongoing case.158
Therefore, at most, Judge Scheindlin’s comments are on par with the
statements in Young, and they do not rise to the level of Antar, which called
for an exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine.159 In Antar, the
judge’s statement that his goal was to give back to the public what the
defendant took evinces a bias that existed before the current case, whereas
the extrajudicial source doctrine contemplates biases that are created and
espoused during the current trial.160 Therefore, the judge in Antar showed
his bias before the merits of the actual case were presented to him whereas
Judge Scheindlin spoke on the validity of the plaintiff’s claim as it was
presented to her throughout the colloquy and earlier proceedings.161 The
judge in Antar evinced such a high degree of antagonism to the defendant,
and in fact stated that his goal at trial was something other than what it
should have been, while Judge Scheindlin did not show an improper goal—
or any goal—as she spoke on the validity of the plaintiff’s claims.162
Therefore, because Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the plaintiffs do not
evince an improper goal as in Antar, and instead speak to the validity of a
parties’ claim as in Young, the Second Circuit should not have considered

157. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 542 (demonstrating that in-court statements and actions
of a judge can only be considered in the rarest circumstances where there is evidence of
deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that precludes a fair judgment).
158. Compare Young, 45 F.3d at 1414 (excluding the consideration of a statement
by the judge of the defendant’s obvious guilt), with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736
F.3d at 121 (considering a judge’s statements to a plaintiff on the merits of his case
before a claim has been filed).
159. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 573 (3d Cir 1995) (finding an
exception to the extrajudicial source doctrine as the judge’s statement of his goal to
give back to the public made a fair judgment appear impossible).
160. See id. at 576 (illustrating how the judge’s statements of giving back to the
public at the outset of the case evince an appearance of bias that may have existed prior
to the current proceeding).
161. See id. at 578 (noting that the when a judge forms his opinions in a separate
civil case, he must be careful to not have those opinions spill over to his goal in a
criminal case).
162. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 138 (speaking in court on the
chance of success of the plaintiffs prospective claims against the NYPD).
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the colloquy due to the extrajudicial source doctrine.163
2. Judge Scheindlin’s History of Jurisprudence, though Mentioned in an
Extrajudicial Source, Should Not Weigh on her Impartiality Because it
Concerns In Court Statements and Actions that are Protected by the
Extrajudicial Source Doctrine.
Judges cannot control everything that is written about them.164
Consequently, Judge Scheindlin’s history of jurisprudence mentioned in
The New Yorker and the New York Law Journal articles should not have
been considered because prior adverse rulings are not to be considered in a
§ 455(a) analysis.165 Nichols and the extrajudicial source doctrine make
clear that prior adverse rulings do not weigh on a judge’s impartiality under
§ 455(a).166 Additionally, the New York County Lawyers Association
criticized the mayoral report as incomplete and based on a small sample
size.167 To consider it would then require a reviewing court to engage in
speculation that the Nichols court barred from § 455 analysis.168 Therefore,
Judge Scheindlin’s previous rulings mentioned in the article should not be
considered because they are prior adverse rulings barred by the
extrajudicial source doctrine.169 Additionally, even if the previous ruling
study was relevant, its small size render it inadequately supported to be
more than impermissible speculation.170
163. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 22 (finding that circuit
courts have followed Liteky’s analysis in generally denying consideration of judicial
statements under a § 455(a) analysis).
164. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that judges are
not responsible for reporters’ and authors’ opinions about them under a § 455(a)
analysis).
165. See generally Toobin, Rights and Wrongs, supra note 65 (alluding to a study
conducted by the New York City Mayor’s Office that found that Judge Scheindlin
suppressed more evidence as fruits of illegal searches than any of her colleagues).
166. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (articulating that prior adverse rulings do not
justify a finding of partiality under § 455(a)).
167. See Neumeister, supra note 71 (mentioning the New York County Lawyers
Association’s dismissal of the report by the Mayor’s office as based on too small a
sample size).
168. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (precluding “rumor and speculation” from a
finding of bias or the appearance of impartiality under a § 455(a) analysis).
169. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that, per the
extrajudicial source doctrine, in court statements and prior adverse rulings are not
grounds for disqualification).
170. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(illustrating that § 455(a) recusal does not call for a reviewing court to engage in
speculation).
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In the circuit decisions refusing to grant recusal motions based on
statements made during the current trial, the judge had made comments
critical to the criminal defendant.171 For instance, in Young the judge stated
pre-trial that the defendant would obviously be convicted.172 In Judge
Scheindlin’s case, her comments and previous rulings appear to favor the
criminal defendant in that she grants motions to suppress more frequently
than her colleagues and described herself as skeptical of law enforcement;
likewise, they should be equally barred from consideration under the
extrajudicial source doctrine.173 Stating the she is skeptical of law
enforcement is akin to a statement of upholding the law, and does not speak
on the merits of any one case that the judge is hearing.174 Judge
Scheindlin’s in court statements or rulings for the defendant are analogous
to the judge in Young’s in court statements for the government, in that they
express a willingness to uphold the law, and are thus insufficient to find the
appearance of bias.175 Similarly, Judge Scheindlin’s statements are
distinguishable from the Antar judge’s statements against the criminal
defendant because she never stated an improper pretrial goal such as giving
back what the NYPD took to the public.176 Therefore, Judge Scheindlin’s
comments to the plaintiffs in Daniels and her previous adverse rulings
against the NYPD should not have been considered to weigh on her
impartiality under § 455(a).177
Reviewing the Second Circuit’s
disqualification of Judge Scheindlin highlights certain instances where the

171. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405, 1414 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding
no appearance of bias where a federal judge stated prior to trial that the “obvious”
outcome was that the criminal defendant would be convicted).
172. See id. (describing the judge’s guilty plea colloquy with the defendant where
the judge predicted that “the coming attractions” would see the defendant convicted).
173. See Neumeister, supra note 71 (referring to a Bloomberg administration study
that found that sixty percent of Judge Scheindlin’s fifteen written “search-and-seizure”
rulings since she took the bench in 1994 had gone against law enforcement).
174. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (establishing
that media interviews alone do not raise the appearance of bias, except where a judge
discusses the merits of the parties’ positions in an ongoing case).
175. See Nichols v. Alley, 71 F. 3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (listing prior adverse
rulings and a willingness to uphold the law—in court or out of court—as insufficient to
disqualify under § 455(a)).
176. See United States v. Antar, 53 F.3d 568, 576 (3d Cir. 1995) (ordering
disqualification where a judge stated that his goal from the outset was to give back to
the public what the defendant took because the judge’s statement evinced such a high
degree of favoritism that fair ruling would be impossible).
177. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (affirming the general
bar on extrajudicial statements in consideration of a federal judge’s impartiality).
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court erred.178 First, the Second Circuit misapplied the § 455(a) standard
for disqualification by not acknowledging that a § 455(a) reasonable person
is one with knowledge of the underlying facts and law.179 Additionally, the
Second Circuit erred in finding that the media interviews with Judge
Scheindlin showed the appearance of bias, because the characterizations of
the judge’s leanings were made by the author and the statements about the
merits of the Floyd case were attributed by to lawyers involved with the
case.180 Finally, the court misapplied the extrajudicial source doctrine in
considering Judge Scheindlin’s statements to the plaintiffs in Daniels
without providing a justification for the extreme circumstances that warrant
an extrajudicial source doctrine exception.181
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Different circuit courts have applied different understandings of §
455(a).182 Section 455(a) provides for a fact-specific analysis, but the
statute does not give guidance on what type of factual scenarios lead to an
appearance of bias.183 Subsection (a) consists of one sentence, and unlike
subsection (b), it does not specifically outline scenarios that give rise to a
finding of partiality.184 The vagueness of § 455(a) is evident in the
178. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2013) (analyzing
Judge Scheindlin’s conduct from the perspective of a reasonable observer as a opposed
to a well-informed reasonable person with knowledge of the facts and law).
179. See Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (instructing that, for § 455(a)
purposes, judges are not responsible for reporters’ personal opinions about them or
characterizations of the judge in the media).
180. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
media interviews alone do not raise the appearance of bias, provided the judge does not
discuss the merits of a case over which he or she is presiding).
181. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (affirming the extrajudicial source doctrine’s
presumption that in court statements do not weigh on a judge’s impartiality except in
circumstances where fair judgment would be impossible).
182. Compare In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (applying a reasonable
person standard that does not mention the underlying knowledge of the facts) with
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (analyzing
conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the underlying
facts and law).
183. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) (2012) (providing a one sentence review standard
whereby a federal judge should be disqualified if his or her impartiality could
reasonably be questioned).
184. See id. at § 455(b) (providing that, in addition the test from subsection (a), a
federal judge shall also disqualify himself or herself where the judge has served as a
lawyer in the controversy, has a financial or fiduciary interest in the matter, or he or she
has served as a witness in the case).
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divergent outcomes and applications of the statute, its standard, its
conception of reasonableness, and what the statute calls a reviewing court
to consider.185
A. The § 455(a) Standard is Too Vague Because it has Resulted in Different
Applications Across the Federal Circuits, as Seen in the Outcomes of Perry
and Floyd.
Both the Northern District of California in Perry and the Second Circuit
in Floyd considered a trial judge’s impartiality under § 455(a); however,
they applied different interpretations of the statute that resulted in different
outcomes for the respective trial judges.186 § 455(a) governs the conduct of
federal judges, meaning it covers judges in the Northern District of
California and the Second Circuit alike and it should thus be uniformly
applied.187 However, in Perry, the Northern District of California applied
the reasonableness language from the statute to mean an informed,
thoughtful person with knowledge of the facts and the law.188 On the other
hand, in Floyd, the Second Circuit only considered Judge Scheindlin’s bias
from the perspective of a “reasonable observer” without mention of the
knowledge and informed requirements mentioned by the Perry court.189
The vagueness of the statute results in different applications of the
recusal standard across different federal circuits, with the Ninth Circuit
applying a higher standard for recusal, and the Second Circuit applying a
lower standard for disqualification.190 The § 455 standard originates from
Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct and the Ninth Circuit’s
185. See, e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (finding that recusal
was required based partially on judicial sources, despite the extrajudicial source
doctrine’s limitation on consideration of in court statements by a federal judge).
186. Compare id. (applying § 455(a) and finding the appearance of impartiality,
thereby disqualifying Judge Scheindlin), with Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1121
(analyzing a judge’s conduct under § 455(a) and finding no appearance of bias).
187. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 127, at 1 (illustrating that, while §
144 aims at actual bias, § 455 governs the appearance of bias for federal judges).
188. See Perry, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29 (noting that, under Ninth Circuit case
law, the reasonable person envisioned by § 455(a) is thoughtful and informed on the
underlying facts at law of the case when viewing a judge’s impartiality).
189. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 127 (examining Judge
Scheindlin’s comments to the plaintiffs in Daniels from the perspective of a reasonable
observer, and finding that these statements give rise to the appearance of bias).
190. See Brian P. Leitch, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts: A
Proposal to Conform Statutory Provisions to Underlying Policies, 67 IOWA L. REV.
525, 536 (1982) (illustrating the differing interpretations of § 455 across the federal
circuits, focusing specifically on the Ninth, Fifth, and Third Circuits).
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application of § 455 has retained part of the bias in fact, as opposed to
appearance, requirements.191 This tension between bias in fact and bias in
appearance has since been resolved mainly in favor of the appearance
standard as evidenced by the Second Circuit.192 However, the ambiguity in
the progress of the interpretation of § 455, even in the Second Circuit, is
still present, as seen by the mention of Judicial Canon 3C in its first opinion
about Judge Scheindlin.193 This mention of Canon 3C and its bias in fact
finding was later limited to § 455(a) by the Second Circuit in its second
opinion on November 13, but the ambiguous requirements of § 455 show
through in this discrepancy.194 Therefore, the applications of § 455 in
recent years have seen inconsistent applications across, and even within,
the Courts of Appeals.195 This ambiguity, and the inconsistent application
of § 455, must be cured so that federal judges and reviewing courts have
clear guidelines as to what conduct warrants disqualification.196
B. Section 455(b) Provides a Separate Test and Provides More Factual
Guidelines for Reviewing Courts That, If Similar Guidelines were Included
in Subsection (a), May Cure its Ambiguity.
In contrast to the one-sentence standard provided by subsection (a),
subsection (b) provides an additional test for partiality that includes a
number of fact-specific guidelines to aid reviewing courts.197 The
inconsistency in the application of (a) could be remedied by providing
more guidelines as to factual determinations of the appearance of bias that
191. See id. (describing the influence that Judicial Code Canon 3C has on the bias
in fact interpretation of § 455 in the Ninth Circuit).
192. See id. at 535-37 (chronicling the general shift in interpretation of § 455 from
requiring a finding bias-in-fact to one of merely requiring the a finding of the
appearance of bias in the federal circuit courts).
193. See Ligon v. City of New York, 538 F. App’x 101 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding that
Judge Scheindlin’s conduct during the Floyd litigation caused her to “run afoul” of
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges).
194. See In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d at 129 (qualifying the panel’s
earlier ruling and stating that it found no actual bias or code of conduct violations but
reiterating that Judge Scheindlin’s impartiality could still be reasonably questioned
under § 455(a)).
195. Compare Ligon, 538 F. Appx. at 101 (finding bias-in-fact under § 455 and
under Canon 3C) with In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F. 3d at 129 (finding no actual
bias under § 455 for the same judge under the same circumstances).
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)-(b) (providing several tests, both objective and
subjective, for the disqualification or self-recusal of federal judges).
197. See, e.g., § 455(b)(1) (calling for a judge to disqualify himself where he or she
has personal bias or prejudice toward a party or personal knowledge of the disputed
facts of that may be introduced as evidence in the proceeding).
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has been explored in the § 455(a) case law.198 Where subsection (b)(4)
discusses the improper financial stake that supports a finding of the
appearance of bias, subsection (a) could add a provision that discusses the
extrajudicial source doctrine and its very narrow exceptions.199 Likewise,
where subsection (b)(2) discusses a judge’s prior work as a lawyer on the
matter, an addition to subsection (a) could explain the extent—or lack
thereof—that judges can discuss an ongoing proceeding in the media.200
Subsection (a) is not necessarily inferior to subsection (b) due to its brevity,
however its inconsistent application in the Perry and Floyd cases, and its
history of confusion among the federal circuits, illustrates that the statute
may need to be revised and expanded.201
IV. CONCLUSION
§ 455(a) governs the impartiality of federal judges, and calls for
disqualification where a judge’s impartiality may reasonably be
questioned.202
The Second Circuit misapplied this statute in its
disqualification of Judge Scheindlin because it failed to consider that a
reasonable person is one who is informed in the facts and law, it
improperly concluded that Judge Scheindlin’s media interviews during the
proceedings gave the appearance of bias, and it erroneously considered incourt statements that Judge Scheindlin made to the plaintiffs in Daniels.203
A comparison of the Second Circuit’s ruling against Judge Scheindlin with
the Northern District of California’s ruling for Judge Walker illustrates the
ambiguity surrounding § 455(a), an ambiguity that may be cured by adding
additional factual guidelines as in § 455(b).204
198. See, e.g., Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing seven
unique factual circumstances—from judge’s prior opinions, public statements,
colloquies with the parties—and how those circumstances reflect judicial impartiality
under § 455(a)).
199. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (ruling that in court
statements by a judge are not part of the § 455 analysis, except in rare circumstances
showing extreme favoritism).
200. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 995 (10th Cir. 1993) (disqualifying a
judge who appeared on television and stated that one of the parties in a current case he
was hearing was clearly breaking the law).
201. See Leitch, supra note 190, at 535-36 (discussing the varying interpretations of
the standard provided by § 455 across the federal circuits).
202. See id. at 526 (outlining the purpose of § 455 since its inception in 1974).
203. See e.g., In re Reassignment of Cases, 736 F.3d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2013)
(analyzing Judge Scheindlin’s colloquy with the plaintiffs in Daniels from the
perspective of a reasonable “observer”).
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)-(5) (providing various additional guidelines to
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analyze a federal judge’s duty to recuse himself for bias or prejudice).
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